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Landlord influence on soil conservation practice adoption
Abstract
The objective of this study is to identify which farm or farmer characteristics explain tenants’ perceptions of whether 
landlords are supportive or not of no-till farming and to describe landlords’ attitudes towards tenants switching to no-
till on their land. Results indicate that size of farm, percentage of the farm in wheat, and having a cash lease were found 
to be the most significant variables influencing farmers’ perceptions about landlords’ disposition toward no-till or more 
intensive spring cropping. The first two were negatively correlated and the last was positively correlated. Overall, 
farmers appeared to be more pessimistic regarding landlords’ acceptance of no-till than were landlords themselves.
Keywords: tenant, landlord, conservation, logit.
JEL Classification: Q50.
Introduction©
In Washington State there has been a long history of 
farmland leasing and it has increased slightly in 
recent years. The 1997 Census of Agriculture indi-
cated that 44.9% of all farmland in the state was 
leased, which was 3.9% more than in 1972 (USDC, 
1999). The two dominant farmland leasing arrange-
ments in the state are crop share and cash lease. Un-
der crop share the lessor and lessee agree to share the 
yield and certain expenses in specified proportions. 
The common crop share lease for wheat is Ҁ of the 
crop to the tenant and ѿ to the landlord. While peas 
and lentils, are split commonly ¾ and ¼ for tenant 
and landlord, respectively. Landlords always pay 
100% of the property taxes and sometimes split with 
the tenant the herbicide, fertilizer, and/or crop insur-
ance costs in the same proportion as the crop. Crop 
share leases share risk between landlord and tenant 
because no crop share is paid to the landlord if there 
is a crop failure. Cash leases are a fixed monetary 
amount per year, due regardless of crop performance. 
Cash leases transfer all production risk to the lessee. 
Crop share leases are dominant in the dryland cereal 
growing region of eastern Washington. A survey by 
Willett et al. (1987) showed 86% of all leases were 
crop share in Whitman County. 
Langemeier (1997) described five basic principles 
for a successful crop share lease: (1) yield increas-
ing inputs should be share by tenant and landlord; 
(2) share arrangements should be adjusted as tech-
nology changes (such as shifts to conservation till-
age); (3) total crop returns should be divided in the 
same proportion as resources contributed; (4) com-
pensation for long-term investments should occur at 
termination through land or other resource value 
changes; and (5) good landowner/tenant communi-
cation is a key to a successful lease. Willett et al.
(1987) described two objectives of a desirable lease 
as: (1) obtaining optimum economic efficiency in 
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the use of resources; and (2) equity in allocating 
returns between the landowner and lessee. 
Burgener and Dillon (1999) studied how techno-
logical advances changed the equitable shared lease 
in Nebraska. They found that when conservation 
tillage and intensive spring cropping were intro-
duced the traditional Ҁ-ѿ share lease for wheat-
fallow changed to ¾-¼. This provided a fairer return 
for the tenant, because of the additional production 
expenses associated with intensive cropping sys-
tems. The new crop share fairly provided the land-
owner the same return as under the traditional crop-
share. However, inertia in crop shares may slow 
environmentally and economically desirable techni-
cal changes in farming. 
Landlord attitudes have sometimes retarded technical 
change in the past (Dillman and Carlson, 1982). Their 
survey indicated that 38% of eastern Washington-
northern Idaho farmers stated “landlord resistance” as 
a moderate or very important reason for farmers not 
doing a better job of controlling soil erosion. 
In eastern Washington more intensive rotations and 
direct seeding are two common conservation prac-
tices (Upadhyay et al., 2003). Whitman county 
growers have increased no-till farmland from 2.9% 
of county farmland in 1989 to 12.1% in 1998 
(CTIC, 2001). Landlords will normally contend with 
both positive and negative consequences from ten-
ants switching to no-till and intensive spring crop-
ping. For the short run, the landlord’s fractional 
share of crop and income may be reduced if crop 
shares are split in accordance with the new resource 
contributions, and may cause apprehension by the 
landlords. However, the annual dollar return to the 
landlord may not be reduced as shown by Burgener 
and Dillon (1999). In the long run, landlords would 
be beneficiaries of improved land quality, which is 
protected by conservation tillage. But in the end 
landlords may have different attitudes pertaining to 
soil quality improvements and different tolerances 
in waiting for long-run payoffs. 
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Government program changes can also influence land-
lord and tenant lease negotiations. Since 1985 land-
lords have had the option of enrolling erodible land in 
the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). In return 
for planting perennial grass on CRP land for 10 years, 
the landlord receives an annual payment from the gov-
ernment. Some prospective tenants have argued that 
the CRP has reduced the supply of rentable land and 
increased the bargaining terms for landlords. 
The objective of this study is to use survey data 
from eastern Washington to (1) statistically analyze 
which farm or farmer characteristics explain ten-
ants’ perceptions of whether landlords are suppor-
tive or not of no-till farming; and (2) describe land-
lords’ attitudes towards tenants switching to no-till 
on their land. 
1. Materials and methods
Data for this study came from an exploratory survey 
of participants attending field days and farm meet-
ings in Benton, Lincoln, and Whitman Counties in 
Washington during early 2003. The sample included 
27 completed one-page questionnaires from farmer-
tenants and 11 from landlords. Farmer perceptions 
of landlord influence on no-till adoption were ascer-
tained by the question: What do you feel are the 
main barriers, and/or encouragements which land-
lords represent with regard to switching to no-till, or 
to more intensive rotations, in your area?
Responses to question (1) were divided into the 
binary variable ENCOUR coded (1) indicated they 
considered landlords encouraged no-till or discour-
aged no-till coded (0) (Table 1). For this study “no-
till” included “no-till or more intensive rotations.” In 
a previous large regional survey, the two practices 
were adopted together 58% of the time (Upadhyay et 
al., 2003). The following farm and farmer character-
istics listed in Table 1 were used in the analysis. 
LEASE describes whether the farmer has predomi-
nantly cash (coded 1) or crop-share (coded 0) leased 
land. SIZE represents the size of the farm in acres. 
%WHEAT represents the percentage of the farm in 
wheat. EDUC represents the farmer’s level of educa-
tion with 0 indicating high school graduate, 1 if some 
college or technical school, and 2 if college graduate. 
%RENTED indicates the percent of farm rented. 
%RENT_REL indicates the percentage of farmland 
rented from relatives. 
Table 1. Description of variables used in farmer 
survey conducted in 2003 
Variable Unit Description 
Dependent:
ENCOUR (1,0) 1 if landlord encourages adoption, 0 if landlord 
discourages
Independent:
LEASE (1,0) 1 if lease is cash, 0 if crop-share 
SIZE Acres Acres 
%WHEAT Percent Percentage of farm in wheat 
EDUC (0,1,2) 0 if high school graduate, 1 if some college or 
technical school, 2 if college graduate 
%RENTED_REL Percent  Percent of farm rented from relatives  
%RENTED Percent Percent of farm rented 
The primary attitudinal question in the landlord 
questionnaire was “What do you feel are the main 
advantages, and/or disadvantages, associated with 
your tenants switching either to no-till, or to more 
intensive rotations, on your cropland?” Responses to 
this question were then used to divide the small 
sample of 11 landlords between (1) those where no-
till or intensive rotations’ advantages predominated 
and (2) for those where disadvantages predomi-
nated. Agricultural characteristics elicited in the 
landlord questionnaire were: would allow change in 
crop rents with no-till adoption, lease type (cash or 
share, percent), rainfall (inches) on their rented land, 
% wheat on their rented land, total acres rented to 
others, number of landlords they knew who had no-
tilling renters. Personal characteristics elicited in the 
landlord questionnaire were: male or female, age 
(years), distance from their home to their rented 
farmland (miles), % of their land rented to relatives.  
Logit regression analysis was conducted to statistically 
measure how closely the different farm and farmer 
characteristics were related to the farmers’ perceptions 
of how supportive landlords were of no-till. Logit 
model places the estimated probabilities inside the 
binary 0-1 variable without actually creating probabil-
ity estimates of 0 or 1 (Kennedy, 1998). The depend-
ent variable was described by a binary ‘ENCOUR’
variable, which represents a tenant’s perception of 
landlords’ encouragement or discouragement for a 
switch to no-till. In addition to the statistical results, 
some verbatim comments of responding farmers are 
provided for possible insight and interpretation of ten-
ant’s perception of landlords’ encouragement or dis-
couragement for a switch to no-till. In contrast to the 
farmer survey data, no statistical analysis is provided 
for the landlord data because of the small number (11) 
of respondents. However a descriptive comparison of 
means of landlord characteristics for both those con-
sidering no-till advantageous and those considering it 
disadvantageous is presented.
2. Results and discussion
2.1. Farm and farmer characteristics. Of the 27 
farmers surveyed, 44% reported that their landlords 
encouraged no-till (Table 2). Current lease terms 
were 88% crop-share and 12% cash. Of the respon-
dents, 88% had graduated from college, and two had 
a master’s degree and one a doctorate. Farm size 
ranged from 650 to 7000 acres with an average of 
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3344 acres. Average percent of farm in wheat was 
54.4%. Percent of farm rented ranged from zero to 
100 with a relatively high average of 72.6%. Percent 
of farm rented from relatives also ranged from zero 
to 100 and with an average of 24.7%. 
Table 2. Farm and farmer characteristics 
Variable Value N % of 0 % of 1 % of 2 
Categorical:  
ENCOUR (1,0) 27 56 44  
LEASE (1,0) 27 12 88  
EDUC (0,1,2) 27 04 07 88 
Continuous:  Average  
SIZE Acres 27 3344.4   
%WHEAT Percent 27 54.4   
%RENT Percent 27 72.6   
%RENT_REL Percent 27 24.7   
Note: ENCOUR = 0 if landlord discourages adoption or 1 if 
encourages. LEASE = 0 if crop-share lease or 1 if cash, EDUC = 
0 if highest education is high school, 1 if some college or tech-
nical school, 2 if college graduate. 
2.2. Producers. Based on the Pearson chi-square, 
the equation (Table 3) was statistically significant at 
the 10% level when testing the global null hypothe-
sis that all coefficients equal zero. Probability of 
landlord encouragement at the mean (Y = 1) is zero. 
For this exploratory model with a small sample size, 
it was promising to note that farm SIZE was nega-
tively related at the 7.8 percent statistical level to 
farmers’ perception of landlords’ supportiveness of 
no-till. This suggests a hypothesis that smaller acre-
age farmers have had a more positive experience 
with landlords when adopting no-till, than larger 
acreage farmers. Possibly landlords have found that 
smaller acreage farmers have had the time to prop-
erly manage no-till fields. However, farmers’ com-
ments show there is some diversity of views and 
experience within farm size levels and other attrib-
utes. One producer with a farm size of 2400 acres, 
reports, “My landlords are all older than 65 years 
and have been very open and good to deal with 
(when switching to no-till).” In contrast, a producer 
that farms 3400 acres, (67% wheat with crop-share 
leases), stated landlords don’t encourage adoption 
no-till because “It doesn’t look as good to them as 
cultivation.” A producer that rents all farm land, 
farms 4200 acres, 67% wheat and leases half by crop-
share and half cash cites that “Not too many barriers 
as far as switching to no-till, but more intensive rota-
tions are hard to accomplish when the number one 
cash crop is winter wheat and all other crops seldom 
breakeven.” Another producer that farms 2000 acres, 
that intensively crops 100% wheat under all crop-
share leases, responded “Landlords don’t understand 
the benefits from direct seeding and worry about 
income” as the main barrier to no-till. 
Table 3. Logit regression coefficients and their statistical significance 
 Intercept EDUC SIZE %WHEAT %RENT %RENT_REL LEASE 
Coefficient 3.839 -.8545 -.00064 -.0434 -.00954 .0107 2.744 
Significance .2137 .1490 .0780 .1156 .5671 .5295 .1490 
%WHEAT was significantly negatively related at 
the 11.6 percent level to perceptions of landlords’ 
supportiveness of no-till and crop diversity. This 
provides some modest preliminary evidence that 
diversified farmers (less wheat) have experienced 
a more positive reception by landlords to no-till. 
Some research has shown that diversified crop-
ping fosters no-till success (Boerboom et al., 
1993). One producer with only 33% wheat re-
ports, “It is important to show landlords cost and 
yield comparison against conventional systems. 
[Provide] good communication and education by 
the renter and get the landlord involved. Show 
them with pictures and tours of their land.” 
The only other variable with even modest statistical 
support is that farmers with cash LEASE have a 
more optimistic view of landlords’ approval of no-
till. This seems plausible because with cash leases 
landlords are shouldering less risk if no-till fails.  
One producer with all cash leases reports “Informa-
tion and education. Most of my landlords are absen-
tee with little knowledge of agriculture. Mostly in-
terested in environment and their finances.”  
Overall, EDUC, SIZE, %WHEAT, and %RENT were 
negatively associated with perceptions of landlord 
supportiveness of no-till; however, EDUC and 
%RENT displayed very low levels of statistical sig-
nificance. LEASE and %RENT_REL responded posi-
tively to landlord encouraging no-till, but the latter 
had an unacceptable statistical significance level. 
In addition to %RENT_REL being non-significant 
statistically testimony of respondents was mixed 
regarding landlord encouragement of no-till. One 
respondent with 100% of his cropland crop-share 
rented, 90% from relatives, cited landlords as a dis-
couraging influence to no-till because “They want 
to guarantee that their income doesn’t change, and 
they cannot withstand criticism from neighbors or 
coffee clutches.” Another grower who leased 75% 
of his farm acreage and zero percent from relatives 
stated, “My landlord has been very positive and 
behind me in my direct seeding program.”
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2.3. Landlords. Seventy two percent of the 11 sur-
veyed landlords favored no-till as an advantageous 
practice (Table 4) while 28% of the landlords con-
sidered no-till as a disadvantageous practice. Of 
landlords considering no-till as advantageous about 
75% reported that one of the primary benefits of 
more intensive rotations or no-till was “erosion con-
trol.” One landlord reports that “Advantages are 
conserve soil – less cultivating – we have steep hills 
and clay knolls. This supplies nutrients to the soil 
and prevents erosion”. Interestingly 67% of those 
viewing no-till as disadvantageous also reported 
erosion control as an advantage, but felt that “risk” 
and “weed infestation” made more intensive rota-
tions or no-till unappealing. 
However, many landlords saw a mix of advantages 
and disadvantages. For example, one landlord whole-
ases 2000 acres, crop-shares and is 67% wheat, cites 
that benefits are “More acres in crop, better crop if it 
rains” and disadvantages “when rainfall low, yields are 
low.” While another landlord that leases 150 acres, 
67% wheat with a crop-share lease states “Advantages 
should have better soil on the farm, should have less 
erosion. We might make more money with a more 
intensive rotation. Disadvantages, will my present 
tenant be able to keep up with a rapidly changing 
learning curve? Will I end up with weed problems a 
future tenant will not be able to control?”  
Sixty two and half percent of landlords who favored 
no-till reported using crop-share leases, whereas 
100% of those who disfavored the practice reported 
using crop-share leases (Table 4). When landlords 
were asked, “If one of your renters wished to switch 
to a more intensive rotation from a less intensive 
rotation on one or more of your leases, please de-
scribe any change in lease terms you would permit 
upon switching.” 37.5% of respondents favoring no-
till reported no change in lease terms, 37.7% would 
negotiate, 12.5% already required spring cropping, 
and 12.5% might negotiate on spring crops. 
Table 4. Comparison of attribute averages for landlords who favor and disfavor no-till 
Landlord categories 
Attributes Unit 
Favors no-till* Disfavors no-till* 
Change in crop rents with no-till adoption (decrease) % 3 0 
Crop-share lease % 63 100 
Rainfall (av in/yr) Inch 17 21 
Wheat  % 58 44 
Acres rented Acres 1619 765 
Known landlords with no-tilling renters Number 2 1 
Rented to relatives % 25 0 
Home to farm distance Miles 60 12 
Age (landlord) Years 56 55 
Male % 63 100 
Sample size Number 8 3 
Note: * indicates landlord’s perception about more advantages or disadvantages in switching to no-till or more intensive crop rotations. 
Landlords were asked “Some argue that no-tilling 
increases the long-run quality and productivity of the 
land by limiting erosion and boosting organic matter. 
What percentage reduction in annual cropland rents, if 
any, would this long run land quality improvement be 
worth to you?” 37.5% of landlords favoring no-till 
reported willingness to make an average reduction of 
8.5% in lease rent, while 62.5% of those favoring no-
till indicated no willingness to change lease rent. One 
landlord that rents out 4000 acres, and reported no 
willingness to change lease rent, stated, “Direct 
seeding should be a better method to farm costing 
less to the farmer. We would expect our farmers to 
use the latest farming techniques and always use the 
best available farming methods. We should both 
benefit.” Not surprisingly, no landlords disfavoring 
no-till indicated a willingness to decrease their rent 
with no-till. 
Other questions included in landlord questionnaire 
were: lease type, rainfall on their land, % wheat on 
their land, number of leases, acres rented, number of 
landlords known with no-tilling renters, % rented to 
relatives, distance from landlord’s home to farm, age, 
and gender (Table 4). Landlords favoring no-till had 
higher %WHEAT cropped, more crop-share leases, 
greater acres rented, more other landlords known 
who had no-tilling renters, and greater home to farm 
distance. Landlords disfavoring no-till had higher 
rainfall and were 100% male. 
Conclusions
Size of farm, percentage of the farm in wheat, and 
having a cash lease were the three most significant 
variables influencing farmers’ perceptions about land-
lords’ disposition toward no-till. The first two were 
negatively correlated and the last was positively corre-
lated. Generally, farmers were more pessimistic re-
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garding landlords’ acceptance of no-till than were 
landlords themselves. Only 44 percent of surveyed 
farmers saw landlords as favoring no-till, but 72 
percent of landlords characterized themselves as 
favoring no-till. However, fewer landlords reported 
willingness to cut rents to tenants who no-tilled their 
land. Perhaps landlords’ general support for no-till 
was offset in tenants’ eyes by their reluctance to 
offer concrete incentives for no-till adoption. This 
might underlie farmer pessimism regarding land-
lords’ support for the practice. 
Currently farmers and landlords generally agree that 
more intensive rotations or no-till can increase soil 
quality and decrease erosion. Income risk and uncer-
tainty seem to be problems for bothlandlords and 
tenants regarding more intensive rotations or no-till. 
Both see potential income risk while landlords also 
perceive future weed problems. Some tenants feel 
landlords need to be educated on the benefits of 
more intensive rotations or no-till. The large per-
centage of crop share leases indicates landlords de-
sire to be involved in the risk of farming. Over time, 
with more successes with these new cropping sys-
tems, more landlords may become convinced of 
their value and offer incentives for their adoption. 
Future research should consider both landlord and 
producer objectives in developing conservation 
farming technologies that appeal to both groups. 
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